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I. 
The idea of self-organisation was invented simultaneously in different fields of 
knowledge, in the natural as well as in the social sciences. Theories such as 
self-referential processes,
1 autopoiesis
2 and second-order-cybernetics,
3 
among many others, spontaneously emerged and began to influence each 
other in a trans-disciplinary discussion and to form a common web of 
theoretical constructs. And in due course these theories stimulated empirical 
research. But while such projects have flourished in areas as diverse as 
economy, psychotherapy and flamenco, in “law and society” there has so far 
been a paucity of empirical research on self-organisation. This anomaly can 
perhaps be traced back to certain peculiarities of legal sociology as a field of 
knowledge. It seems that the long-lasting and deep hiatus between theory 
construction and empirical research is actually deepened by the emergence of 
theories of self-organisation and autopoiesis. This is our first thesis. Secondly, 
if we look more closely at concrete, detailed, historical research carried out in 
the name of autopoiesis, we can discern clear discontinuities with “normal” 
practices of empirical research. Autopoiesis calls for a redefinition of empirical 
work and requires different empirical tools—tools that are capable of analysing 
the transformational dynamics of recursive meaning processes. As a 
consequence, everything changes: research questions, the phenomena to be 
identified, the concepts to be made operational and the analytical instruments. 
But, as if that weren’t enough, there are even stronger anomalies in the socio-
legal relationship between the empirical and the theoretical. The constructivist 
orientation of legal autopoiesis, we submit in our third thesis, works against the 
fantasies of omnipotence inherent in the process of empirical falsification. 
Legal autopoiesis is not anti-empirical, but it does suggest a role for empirical 
research that is different from straightforward Popperian theory-killing. It 
suggests, instead, a quasi-therapeutic relationship between the speculators 
and the data collectors. But who, then, is the therapist and who is the patient? 
II. 
Why is there a structural hiatus between theory and empirical research in law 
and society? In the classics of legal sociology, Marx’s historical methods, 
Durkheim’s choses sociales and the ideal-typical method in Weber’s 
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1 interpretive sociology were guarantees of the unity of empirical research and 
grand theories of law. But then disaster struck for theory with the introduction 
of modern empirical methods.  
The dissolution in data and their recombination with the help of newly 
developed methods of data analysis destroyed the high level of 
theorising which had been built up in the classics without being able to 
substitute it adequately.
4
Today, the field is still suffering from this deep hiatus, which renders theory 
rather empty and empiricism rather blind. Or to put it more mildly, empirical 
research in law and society has developed a highly sophisticated methodology 
which is, however, based on poor and rather ad hoc theorising, while 
theorising about law and society has become more and more philosophical 
and speculative relying, however, on poor and rather ad hoc empirical support. 
And today the hiatus is deepening. Empirical legal sociologists are 
giving in to the temptation of trying economic models and theories for their 
data with the predictable result that they are loosing their sociological identity. 
Meanwhile, legal theorists are tempted to follow the famous “linguistic turn” in 
sociology and thus to question the validity of systematic data collection and 
patient data analysis. 
Usually it is the micro-macro problem that is held responsible for the 
empirico-theoretical gap. Empirical methods are good at gathering individual 
data at the micro level of legal action and aggregate data at the macro level of 
socio-legal relations. But they fail when it comes to analysing law’s “organised 
complexity” which good theory regards as central to understanding law as a 
social phenomenon. Without denying the importance of the micro-macro 
difference, we prefer to identify another famous petite différence as 
responsible for the great hiatus: the difference between law as operation and 
law as observation,
5 which has sharply divided socio-legal theoreticians and 
empiricists. Empirical analysis has opted for first-order observation of the law. 
It takes legal action as simple operations, as spatio-temporal events, which 
can be correlated in their empirical models with other social events. This 
drives empirical analysis of law in two directions: towards models of logical 
and mathematical formalisation on the one hand and towards attempts at 
causal explanation and prediction on the other.
6 In contrast, ambitious 
sociological theories of law are usually second-order observations. They see 
legal action itself as observation, as a trinity of utterance, information and 
understanding, as the recursive transformation of differences, as constructing 
a special space of meaning and an autonomous world of knowledge. This 
drives socio-legal theories deeper and deeper into the hermeneutic tradition, 
which allows for sophisticated analyses of the “operation called Verstehen”, 
but which ridicules attempts at formalisation, causal explanation and 
prediction. And attempts to combine both traditions are sucked into the black 
hole bounded by formalisation, causal explanation and hermeneutics. 
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2 If this is an adequate sketch of the intellectual map, how does self-
reference and autopoiesis change the somewhat desperate outlook for law 
and society? At first sight it looks like Columbus’s egg, as François Ewald has 
called it.
7 It nourishes hope for a recombination of both the empirical-analytical 
and the normative-hermeneutic traditions. It seems to promise a bridge 
between law as operation and law as observation since it compels us to 
combine first- and second-order analysis. Since law is defined as a closed 
system of self-reproductive observing operations, legal action is seen as being 
at the same time both operation and observation. This requires the normative 
tradition to leave Popper’s World III and to search for “law in action” as its 
social base, and it requires the empirical tradition to include in its observations 
the complex chains of normative observations of the “law in the books”. 
But a closer look reveals that autopoiesis offers no easy synthesis. It 
burdens the three traditions—the hermeneutic, the formal and the causal 
orientation—with an almost unbearable task. How to cope with self-reference? 
Hermeneutics, with its long tradition of dealing with self-referential relations, 
reflexivity, paradoxes and hermeneutic circles, is obviously in the best 
position. This explains the rapid development of autopoiesis in hermeneutically 
oriented theories of law. In a view of law as a concatenation of communicative 
events based on a code which deparadoxifies a basic self-referential relation 
autopoiesis has strong (s)elective affinities with discourse analysis as 
developed by the maître-penseurs of poststructuralism: Foucault, Lyotard and 
Derrida. 
The tradition of formalisation in legal theory has much greater 
difficulties with autopoiesis. The reason is that the paradoxes of self-reference 
pose an enormous challenge for a formal calculus. It is true that Hofstadter’s 
famous book on the enigmas of reflexivity and self-reference has had a certain 
impact on legal theory.
8 However, sophisticated attempts to come to terms 
with self-reference, such as Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form,
9 the development 
of a multi-value logic by Günther
10 or “A Calculus for Self-Reference” by 
Francisco Varela
11 have up to now only found one resonance in legal 
sociology which is Niklas Luhmann’s discussion of the legal paradox and the 
binary coding of law.
12
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3 However, the situation for causal explanation and prediction, the 
precious hope of orderly empirical work in law and society that would 
transform it into a real science, is disastrous. For causal analysis, self-
reference is an explosive. The blast comes from a theory of recursive systems 
and from a concept of non-trivial machines; and the blast is so strong because 
these explosive concepts were developed not just from the hermeneutic 
softies of the Geisteswissenschaften but also from the hard-liners of the exact 
sciences. According to the sociologists Krohn and Küppers, who deal with 
problems of the legal regulation of social fields, the results look like this: 
[i]n non-linear systems with a recursive dynamics…there are only few 
cases in which prediction of the system’s development is possible, even 
if their mechanism is known, the systems are deterministic and 
disturbances do not occur...Due to recursion, even very small 
deviations in the initial conditions are reinforced in such a way that 
similar starting constellations lead after a very short time period to 
totally opposite system developments…In the case of a non-linear and 
recursive system dynamics...no prediction of the system’s development 
is possible.
13
And if law as a social system is correctly defined as one of these “non-trivial 
machines” (that is, as one of the deterministic systems whose input-output 
relationship is not invariant, but is determined in a self-referring way by the 
machines’ previous output), then, in the words of von Förster,  
for all practical reasons they are unpredictable: an output once 
observed for a given input will most likely not be the same for the same 
input given later.
14
The only hope for causal explanation and prediction is a trivialisation of law 
and society, their social construction as trivial machines—something that 
happily coincides with the triviality of certain results of attitude and impact 
research, results that everyone familiar with the fields already knew in 
advance. 
So what does this mean for the chances of empirical research in the 
autopoietic framework? Well, they look excellent for all kinds of historical 
analysis, for genealogical and archaeological digging in historical texts, and for 
qualitative research techniques, case studies of formal organisation, 
ethnomethodological types of socio-legal interaction, discourse analysis, for 
“critical empiricism”. And indeed these are the research techniques that are 
mainly used in the empirical projects. For static correlations (of “the more x, 
the more y” variety), however, the chances look rather bleak. 
III. 
But before we get carried away, is it not the case that autopoiesis is simply 
incompatible with the dominant working orientation of orderly empirical 
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4 research, where the task of theory is causal explanation and prediction of 
empirical facts, and the task of empirical research is the reality test of 
hypotheses derived from theoretical constructs? Indeed, it is incompatible. 
Viewed from the constructivist position of autopoiesis, every element of this 
statement about the empirico-theoretical relationship—causal explanation, 
prediction, reality tests—is flawed. 
To put the counter-position bluntly: 
1.  Empirical research is by no means closer to the reality of the outside 
world than theory. Even from empirical experience we know that often 
the opposite is true. The hard facts about the external world that 
empirical research pretends to produce are in reality highly artificial 
constructs, excessively selective abstractions, mere internal artefacts of 
the scientific discourse that are both as real and as fictional as are 
theoretical constructs. 
2.  The real role of empirical research does not lie in dull falsification. It is 
in the “surprise value” of its self-produced data. Empirical world 
constructions in law and society do not need to be destructive of 
theories. Rather, they could play a maeutic role in the birth of theories 
in the spirit of empiricism. 
3.  Causal explanation and prediction are grossly overestimated in law and 
society. They are only special cases of theoretical work, which are 
indeed very rare, and—what is more important—they by no means 
exhaust the potential of theoretical explanation. 
4.  For autopoiesis, theoretical explanation of empirical results means that 
the theory reformulates these artefacts of perception in new contexts in 
order to analyse—let us repeat the central formula—the 
transformational dynamics of recursive meaning processes. 
Let us take a concrete example of the social effects of legislation in order 
discuss this counter-position. Occupational health and safety in Britain’s 
offshore oil industry constitute a well-defined area that has seen considerable 
regulatory development over its 35-year history. Traditional empirical research 
on the effectiveness of law and implementation research suggest the 
construction of a network of dependent and independent variables among 
which we can identify correlations and find out their causal connections.
15 The 
usual causality chain—as Renate Mayntz, for example, tells us—works like 
this: political goal definition → legislative act → legal norm → motivation of 
implementation staff → motivation of actors in the field → 
deviation/sanction/incentive → social behaviour → social effects.
16 In our 
concrete example of offshore health and safety regulation, it is possible to 
trace this sort of causality chain as follows. 
During the early days of the offshore industry in the mid-1960s there 
was no detailed regulation of occupational health and safety, simply an 
instruction from the government that those involved should follow an industry 
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code of practice. When a serious accident occurred in 1965, the inadequacies 
of this approach became evident and an Inquiry chaired by a lawyer 
recommended that “a statutory code with credible sanctions” be implemented 
to provide for the safety of workers in the industry.
17 This recommendation was 
accepted by the government of the day, which introduced a Bill to Parliament 
that eventually became law as the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) 
Act 1971. This provided a framework for the development over a period of 
years of detailed regulations by the regulators (mainly the Petroleum 
Engineering Division of the Department of Energy) covering every aspect of 
the industry from the design and construction of offshore installations to the 
content of first aid kits. These regulations were then implemented and the oil 
companies they were aimed at complied or deviated from them ultimately 
producing an effect on the level of safety that existed in the industry. 
We might summarise this on the basis of the foregoing causal chain as: 
political goal definition by the Ministry of Power Inquiry → introduction of a Bill 
to Parliament by the government → passing of the Mineral Workings (Offshore 
Installations) Act 1971 → development and implementation of detailed 
regulations by the regulators → compliance/deviation by the industry → effects 
on safety. In accordance with this understanding of the regulatory chain, when 
questions are asked about continuing safety problems in the industry, we find 
concern about delay in getting detailed regulations into place and about the 
toughness of the regulators’ enforcement.
18 In other words, control of safety 
will be achieved when detailed regulations are in place telling the industry 
what it must do and when these are being enforced by the regulators. 
Autopoiesis, however, forces us to break up this causal chain of events 
and to replace it by—let us condense everything into one formulation—a 
multitude of autonomous but interfering fields of action in each of which, in an 
acausal and simultaneous manner, recursive processes of transformation of 
differences take place. To put it more simply, a single horizontal chain of 
causal relations is replaced by a multitude of vertical chains of recursions. We 
can indicate this shift graphically in Figure 1. 
 
17 Ministry of Power, Report of the Inquiry into the Causes of the Accident to the Drilling Rig 
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Figure 1: The Shift from a Horizontal Chain of Causal Relations to Vertical Chains of Recursions 
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 Moreover, our framework gives us a new understanding of social 
regulation through law. Understanding these vertical chains of recursions as 
operationally closed means that each constructs information internally: there 
are no input-output relationships between, say, the regulators and the industry. 
As a consequence, attempts by the regulators to steer the industry by means 
of prescriptive regulations backed by sanctions and incentives must be 
understood in a fundamentally different way. Such attempts can only ever be a 
multitude of self-steering processes. More specifically, this self-steering must 
be understood as the minimisation of a difference, an attempt to reduce the 
difference between the current situation and the desired one. This definition is 
consistent with all forms of steering but in the context of a recursively closed 
system of communicative operations the difference is itself internally 
constructed. Thus, offshore safety regulators construct the current situation 
according to their own code and similarly construct a desired situation and 
apply their own programme of difference minimisation in an attempt to arrive at 
it. Given that the industry constructs reality according to its own code and 
steers according to its own difference minimising programme, the limits of 
regulatory ambition become clear. In other words, regulation is possible only 
as self-regulation within each of these recursive processes. Regulation over 
the boundaries of action fields is impossible. Chains of causality need to be 
replaced by simultaneous events of structural coupling. This is not to say, of 
course, that regulatory attempts produce no effects, only that those effects 
cannot properly be regarded as steering in the sense implied by traditional 
theories. Instead, these effects arise from the construction of differences by 
the regulators and their attempts to minimise them but depend on the internal 
construction of differences by the industry and its attempts to minimise them.
19
This is a suggestive idea, but can it be made empirical? The task for 
empirical research in these circumstances would become one of inquiring into 
several chains of difference minimisation and into their interferences. We 
would have to retell in detail several divergent stories of self-regulation in the 
political arena, in the legislative chambers and courtrooms, in the offices of the 
regulatory agencies and in the managerial suites of corporate actors, and on 
the drill-floors of offshore installations. The question would be one of how, in 
each of these stories, the events common to them are idiosyncratically 
reconstructed and processed in the meaning context of their specific 
difference minimisation programmes. To be clear, such a division of the 
regulatory chain into divergent stories does not imply that autopoiesis is bound 
to discover regulatory failure. Autopoiesis is not in some sense the opposite of 
regulatory success, as Nahamowitz seems to believe.
20 Instead, 
understanding steering as self-steering means that the theory accounts for 
regulatory failure and success in ways different from theories where linear 
causality is assumed. So, if we find that our different stories of recursive 
operations travel together for a time in a common direction instead of diverging 
then we can readily speak of regulatory success. 
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fermé
21—this is not a matter of theoretical definition but a matter of empirical 
variation. Autopoiesis theory suggests a variety of closure mechanisms in the 
relations between meaning systems to which correspond a variety of ways in 
which they are open to each other: from ad hoc contacts to systematic 
linkages and long-term co-evolution. Success or failure of regulation 
depends—this is our guiding hypothesis—on the specific qualities of 
interwovenness of several recursive meaning processes, which in turn depend 
on the qualities of their mutual closure. 
This compels us to ask a twofold question when it comes to detailed 
empirical research: 
1.  How can we identify concretely the multitude of elementary acts—
meaning operations—that constitute the autopoietic closure of the 
various processes involved? 
2.  How can we identify the different types of mutual recontextualisation 
that are responsible for a meeting of these closed discourses? 
Applying the first question to our example: are the legislative process and the 
implementation field autopoietic systems? Although we have so far spoken as 
if they are for the sake of the argument, this is not in fact a question we can 
answer theoretically but only by empirical observation. Autopoiesis theory 
does not impose a set of pre-existing systems but rather compels us to 
observe the concrete interactions in legislative chambers, lobby halls and the 
technological processes in our implementation field in order to discover the 
systemicity of our research object. Strangely enough, this reliance on empirical 
knowledge runs counter to the opinion of empirically-minded researchers who 
tend to treat this as an “analytical” question, namely the identification of a 
“system” as the somewhat arbitrary conceptual selection of the field of inquiry 
according to the concrete research interests. In contrast, the system concept 
of autopoiesis is much closer to empirical reality than the abstract models of 
empirical research. 
Unlike the semi-autonomous fields, which, as Griffiths tells us, owe their 
systemic character only to the research designs of legal sociologists,
22 our 
decision about their systemicity is dependent upon observable self-organising 
processes in the social world. Autopoietic systems are produced by self-
organising processes in the social world, not by scientific observers. We need 
careful empirical observation, therefore, in order to find out which operations 
are recursively linking up to other operations in our field so that in their 
concatenation they gain the autonomy of an autopoietic system. In the area of 
the social effectiveness of law, we researchers are by no means free to define 
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9 the concrete legislative process as a “system”. Empirical observation would 
rather compel us to split it up into four or five more or less loosely coupled 
recursive processes: the ongoing power game of the political actors, the quasi-
scientific policy-talk of the experts, the profit-oriented calculations of the 
lobbyists and the doctrinal arguments and constructions of the lawyers. If we 
are interested in regulation we have to identify not only the concrete binary 
codes that are used in each of these processes and the concrete rules of the 
game which they have developed over time but especially the specific 
programmes of difference minimisation that they follow at any given moment: 
strategies of interest and power, reputational gains, policy objectives, risk 
minimisation and the reduction of deviance. 
In addition, we will also have to split up our regulated field into a similar 
multitude of recursive processes. For example, when the object of regulation is 
a specific technology in economic organisations, such as offshore installations, 
does the concrete technology form a system? Autopoiesis would qualify the 
usual definitions of technology as “man-machine-systems” as irresponsibly 
loose talk.
23 Can we identify in the real world elementary operations like “legal 
acts”, “theoretical statements” or “economic transactions” that would process 
technological differences in a binary code? Probably not. What we will find is a 
concrete technology as a social field in which formal organisation ties 
together—with varying degrees of strength—the scientific, economic and 
political processing of distinctions related to technical artefacts.
24 And as 
regards regulation, it would again be important to investigate each of these 
processes to discover their established difference minimisation programmes: 
organisational goals, accumulation of knowledge, profit orientation and so on. 
IV. 
The question arises, however, as to just how we might go about an empirical 
study guided by autopoiesis. What sort of systematic observation must we 
carry out? What sort of tools can we use? What sort of methodology could be 
envisaged that could accommodate more broadly the analysis of several 
systems operating on the basis of different codes and steering by distinct 
difference minimising programmes? 
It is probably the case that only through consideration of individual 
concrete examples can researchers decide upon a methodology that is 
appropriate to each case. If a narrative style seems appropriate, then perhaps 
techniques such as multi-voice or reflexive texts may provide an answer,
25 but 
the ideal would be to find something that could represent more graphically 
what it is that autopoiesis claims to offer to legal sociology. 
Santos provides us with a compelling graphical metaphor for law when 
he describes it as a “map of misreading”,
26 distorting reality systematically 
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10 through the mechanisms of scale, projection and symbolisation. Depending on 
the scale employed, different features of the landscape which law attempts to 
map will appear or disappear; the particular projection used will emphasise 
some features over others; and the symbolisation will say much about the 
cultural background of the law and its intended purpose. Now, whereas Santos 
believes that laws misread reality in order to establish their exclusivity, 
understanding law as an autopoietic system reveals that the misreading is not 
calculated in this way but is rather the inevitable result of law’s autopoietic 
nature—reality is constructed on the basis of the selections made by law 
according to its code (legal/illegal) as it seeks to achieve order from 
complexity. In other words, it is impossible to avoid a misreading and law can 
only observe what its code allows it to construct. But the map metaphor 
remains useful since, in much the same way, a map, because it cannot 
reproduce the world, must offer a selective and incomplete view of that world 
and consequently there is a sense in which that which is not included on the 
map is not real.
27 Indeed, there is in cartography an analogue of the binary 
code of autopoietic systems, namely the tectonic code “which configures 
graphic space in a particular relation to geodesic space”.
28
The map metaphor is, then, a powerful one, but its true potential is only 
released when the following points are taken into account. 
1.  Law’s map is but one of a potentially very large number of similar maps 
arising from the selections of different recursive systems according to 
their own codes, their own attempts to achieve order from complexity. 
2.  Because law (and other recursive systems) are in a state of constant 
change, we must not see the map metaphor as introducing an 
unwarranted element of stasis but rather think of changing or evolving 
maps. 
3.  The second consideration should not, however, lead us so far away 
from the idea of a map that we lose the insight that maps are multiply 
connected; once a particular tectonic code is employed, local changes 
cannot easily be made without having knock-on effects globally; there 
are, therefore, built-in constraints limiting the extent to which changes 
can be made unproblematically—a fact recognised by cartographers 
who concentrate on redundant information thus over-determining the 
main features.
29
If we can, then, see the different autopoietic systems as maps evolving 
through time with the codes and programmes represented by different tectonic 
codes, constraining by this internal multiple connectivity the changes that can 
be made as the maps are recursively redrawn, then we can perhaps get a first 
idea of what the results of autopoiesis research might look like. Such results 
would allow a comparison of the ways in which the same events (whether, for 
example, new regulations, a fall in the price of oil or a major accident) appear 
on the maps of the different systems in our concrete example. Equally, they 
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would allow examples of closer communication between systems to be 
identified. If such results could be attained, then what Luhmann calls second-
order observation would be achieved; that is, the observation of “what others 
observe and what they cannot observe”.
30 But can the map metaphor be made 
more concrete? 
One existing technique (suitably “stripped down”) appears singularly 
appropriate in this regard, not least because it allows us to retain the graphical 
metaphor of the map. More importantly, it is appropriate because it maintains 
an insistence on systematic empirical observation while allowing a 
representation of the multitude of autonomous but interfering fields of action 
into which autopoiesis proposes to break the causality chain: cognitive 
mapping. 
This technique was developed from graph theory by Robert Axelrod,
31 
primarily as a means of examining decision-making processes with a view to 
improving the performance of policy-makers, and it possesses many features 
that render it useful in the present context. The basic idea is extremely simple. 
In analysing, for example, a text or a series of texts, the concepts or constructs 
employed are represented as points, while the causal assertions used to link 
the concepts or constructs are represented as arrows between the points.
32 
Positive and negative causal assertions are signified by the addition of a 
positive and negative sign respectively to the arrow concerned.
33 The basic 
format of the cognitive map is, therefore, as shown in Figure 2.
 
30 N Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1993) 
p108 
31 R Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976) 
32 R Axelrod, ‘The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making’ in R Axelrod (ed.) supra 
n.31, p5 
33 R Axelrod, ‘The Analysis of Cognitive Maps’ in R Axelrod (ed.) supra n.31, p 60 13 
Figure 2: Format of a Cognitive Map 
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 The cognitive map is thus for Axelrod a graphical representation of a 
belief system. In other words, concept or construct A is an explanation of B 
and is an answer to the question “How or why did (or does) B happen?” 
Similarly, concept B is a consequence of A and answers the question “What 
were (or are) the consequences of A?”
34 The details of the technique as 
developed by Axelrod (for example, the mathematical approach to the 
process) are not being discussed here because the value of the technique in 
the present context does not depend on the exact methodology proposed by 
him but rather on its ability to provide a graphical representation of autopoietic 
systems. Indeed, the mathematical element of Axelrod’s methodology implies 
a view of information and its transferability that is at odds with that of 
autopoiesis.
35
In the context of autopoiesis research, cognitive mapping provides a 
means of representing graphically the world which a system has constructed, 
the concepts its code gives it access to as well as the causal relations which 
complete its model of reality. In other words, it allows a picture to be produced 
of the order that a system has created by means of its selections from the 
noise of complexity. In this way, one could imagine cognitive maps being 
produced in our concrete example for legislators, regulators and for different 
sectors of the industry which would allow us to observe not only the economic 
and power relations which other approaches impose on the situation but rather 
the world construction of each system—what each can and cannot observe as 
a result of the application of its code. Similarly, perhaps even finer detail can 
be resolved in the form of the programmes by which each system steers itself, 
which differences it constructs and seeks to minimise. If this could be achieved 
then a potentially rich account of the development of occupational health and 
safety offshore would emerge. Our explanation of regulatory success or failure 
would not be restricted to the dominant rationality of more traditional empirical 
tools but would depend much more upon what the regulators and the 
regulated could and could not observe. 
In this spirit, we can now understand Figure 1 above as displaying the 
cognitive maps respectively of traditional implementation theories of law and of 
autopoiesis. But what about the concrete example of health and safety in the 
offshore oil industry? It is to that example that we now turn. 
V. 
The brief discussion of this topic which follows is drawn from a larger study
36 
and due to the present space restrictions necessarily presents a rather 
truncated and incomplete picture of the subject. The intention, however, is 
primarily to demonstrate the usefulness of cognitive mapping in carrying out 
an empirical study guided by autopoiesis and to demonstrate how a more 
                                                 
34 See M Jones and L Brooks, ‘Addressing Organisational Context in Requirements Analysis 
Using Cognitive Mapping’, University of Cambridge Research Papers in Management Studies, 
1993-1994, No. 17, 6 
35 Cf. J J Savelsberg, ‘The Making of Criminal Law Norms in Welfare States: Economic Crime 
in West Germany’, 21 Law and Society Review 529-561 [1987] 
36 J Paterson, Behind the Mask: Regulating Health and Safety in Britain’s Offshore Oil and 
Gas Industry (Aldershot, etc: Ashgate-Dartmouth, 2000) 
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adequately complex picture of the study area can emerge in terms of different 
codes and individual difference-minimising programmes. 
As was mentioned earlier, occupational health and safety in Britain’s 
offshore oil industry was initially not the subject of any detailed state 
intervention. Only in the aftermath of a serious accident and a Public Inquiry
37 
were moves made to introduce prescriptive regulations. Again as was seen 
previously, the Inquiry criticised the lack of a clear code of statutory authority 
regulating the question of safety offshore and this was precisely the issue that 
the government attempted to address in drafting the legislation. The process 
which saw the passing of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 
1971 together with subsequent parliamentary debates provide us with a view 
of how politics constructed this issue and how it sought to improve safety in 
what it saw as a technologically complex and rapidly developing industry 
operating in a hostile environment. 
These sources reveal that the discussions of the legislators are very 
much influenced by the findings of the Public Inquiry.
38 In place of the previous 
non-interventionist stance, a detailed enforceable code is envisaged. 
Requirements are to be set out clearly and penalties are to be graded. The 
fact that the industry is comparatively new and developing rapidly means that 
there must, however, be flexibility. A comprehensive set of regulations is to be 
made in due course within the framework of the Act. These regulations are 
seen as being more easily adaptable than primary legislation and can thus 
keep pace with technological change. They are envisaged as providing the 
basis for detailed inspection and enforcement by the regulators. Equally, 
concern is expressed that the regulations should not cramp development nor 
lead to excessive expenditure. 
From these deliberations we can construct a cognitive map for 
legislators at the time of the passing of the 1971 Act (Figure 3).
 
37 Ministry of Power, supra n.17 
38 Earl Ferrers, Hansard HL (Debs) 18 Feb. 1971, cols 741-746; Hon. Nicholas Ridley (Under 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry), Hansard HC (Debs) 28 April 1971, cols 645-649. 16 
Figure 3: Cognitive Map for Politics 
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From the cognitive map emerges a fairly standard view of regulation 
and its impact on the area of society at which it is aimed. Perceiving a need to 
act on this issue as determined by the political power code, legislators set up 
the framework for a detailed regulatory response. In other words, they deploy 
a programme of legal instrumentalism. A difference is constructed between the 
current unregulated situation where a number of accidents have occurred and 
the desired situation of improved occupational safety. The programme by 
which this difference is to be minimised, is one of detailed regulatory 
intervention. Regulators will develop detailed norms of action that will tell the 
industry what to do. Provided these norms are followed—and if they are not 
then the regulators can impose sanctions—the difference between the current 
problematic safety situation and the desired situation can be minimised. 
There is nothing particularly surprising here. Not only could we expect 
to find this basic code and programme repeated in many legislative chambers, 
but they are also of course the code and programme which underlie many 
legal theoretical and sociological approaches. Thus, it is not surprising to find 
that in subsequent debates on the issue of offshore safety, legislators maintain 
very much the same code and programme and thus construct a relatively 
stable picture of the problems they confront and the range of appropriate 
solutions.
39
But if this was the understanding of the legislators, what was happening 
when the task was passed on to the regulators? Drawing on material produced 
by the regulators,
40 it is possible to construct the following cognitive map 
shown in Figure 4
 
39 For example, Hansard HC (Debs) 16 January 1974 cols 669-696 following the sinking of the 
Transocean 3 and the disabling of the Transworld 61 in the winter of 1972-73; and Hansard 
HC (Debs) 6 November 1980, cols 1472-1546, following the publication of the Burgoyne 
Report into Offshore Safety. 
40 Especially W R Street, ‘United Kingdom Regulations for Permanent Offshore Structures’, 
Offshore Technology Conference III; 731-736 [1975]  
    Rapidly  changing      Framework  Act  and 
    technology       detailed  regulations 
   +      +      -  
 
Regulation  of  health      Need  for 
and safety at work          rapid adaptation 
in the North Sea 
   +      +      +  
    Ongoing  collection        Functional  regulations    Mutual  respect    
    of  data        and  detailed Guidance    +  between industry    +
 Safety 
            N o t e s        a n d   r e g u l a t o r s  
 
           +  
        Industry  concern 
        with  rigid  interpretation 
        of  regulations 
18 
Figure 4: Cognitive Map for Regulators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In place of the legislators’ ongoing optimism about the capabilities of a 
programme of detailed regulatory intervention, the regulators are aware, from 
the very earliest stages, of the struggle they will have in keeping up with the 
industry. On the one hand there is continual development of the technology, 
and on the other there is a lack of environmental data from the untried waters 
of the North Sea. Both of these factors make even the most rapidly adaptable 
detailed regulations difficult to achieve. Consequently, at a comparatively early 
stage, the regulators abandon the idea of providing detail at the level of the 
regulations as these are simply too cumbersome to adapt to new data and 
new technology. This is a telling point given that the regulations would be 
subject only to minimal negative resolution procedure, which would see them 
pass into law in the absence of active intervention by legislators. But instead, 
the regulations are described as “functional”, laying down only the broad 
principles, with detail being provided at the level of non-mandatory guidance 
notes, which can be withdrawn, replaced or amended with even less formality. 
The regulators are thus operating in a way that would probably trouble 
the legislators. The very fact that the detail is to be at the level of guidance 
notes means that failure to comply with such a requirement would not 
constitute a breach of the law unless it could be shown that the failure to 
comply also contravened the broad principle laid down in the regulation. 
Dubious though this might appear to legislators, it can be seen to be a step 
that is based on the same sort of rationale that motivated them. In other 
words, in the same way that the legislators were unable to provide detail at the 
level of the 1971 Act, so the regulators, faced with a rapidly developing 
technological industry and ever greater refinement of models based on the 
ongoing collection of environmental data, found that even the relatively broad 
confines of negative resolution procedure did not provide the speed and 
flexibility they required. Their response was to develop detail at the yet lower 
level of guidance notes. 
But the programme of legal instrumentalism envisaged by the 
legislators has very clearly become something quite different in the hands of 
the regulators. Faced with technical problems in the form of a lack of data and 
rapidly developing technology, the regulators are also trying to minimise the 
difference between two safety situations (the current and an improved one) but 
the programme of legal instrumentalism no longer appears appropriate. 
Instead, lacking the cognitive resources to develop regulations with any 
degree of certainty and in any event unable to keep pace with developments, 
they adopt a programme of fostering the respect of the industry as a means of 
ensuring that the requirements of guidance notes are complied with. The 
ongoing lament of a variety of commentators about a lack of tough 
enforcement of detailed regulation
41 now appears in a rather different light. 
But if a shift in approach of this magnitude is evident between the 
legislators and the regulators, what happens when we reach the regulated 
area? Although the regulated area is more complex, for the sake of the current 
argument two dominant recursive systems will be considered, those of 
industry management and of engineering. 
                                                 
41 For example, Carson, supra n.18 
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Studying the recursive system of industry management at this period, it 
is immediately clear just how peripheral the issue of occupational health and 
safety is in the context of the entire system. Nor is this as pejorative as it may 
initially sound. The industry does not primarily exist to carry out functions 
associated with the improvement of safety. It exists to explore for and produce 
offshore oil and it is on the basis of this fact that the entire system operates.
42 
It is accordingly possible to construct the detailed cognitive map for this 
system shown in Figure 5.
 
42 P H Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A Key to Oil Economics and Essentials Updated 1968 
(London, Frank Cass, 1968) Figure 5 
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It is not necessary here to go into this map in detail. It is sufficient to 
note that the system stresses certain features of the substance it seeks to 
produce (concealment, state ownership and fluid nature) which in turn 
determine the way in which it must operate (broadly: spreading the risk of 
failed exploration; in accordance with state licensing programmes; and 
continuously). These operational “facts” combined with the added complexity 
of the offshore environment (long lead-in time and extremely high front-end 
loading of costs) mean that the industry is confronted by large economic risks. 
In other words, the self-steering programme of industry management is not 
related to two situations of occupational safety but to two situations of 
economic safety. But we must beware of understanding this too simplistically. 
This does not mean that the industry seeks first and foremost to cut costs. 
While profit is undoubtedly the goal, it sees this as most likely to be achieved 
by reducing the time between expenditure and payback; that is, by 
implementing a programme of rapid production. Industry management 
assesses operations on the basis of the net present value of money not on the 
gross amount it will ultimately receive. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
other legislative interventions (for example, regarding taxation, state 
participation and depletion policy) are constructed by the industry as 
increasing the economic risk and as necessitating the application of the same 
difference-minimising programme. 
Now, whereas other commentators have noted the detrimental effect of 
speed on the occupational health and safety situation,
43 it is now possible to 
see why this speed occurs. It is also possible to see how any rigidity in health 
and safety regulation is constructed by industry management as being 
fundamentally at odds with its need to move as quickly as possible in order to 
minimise economic risk, and how external interventions of any kind are seen 
as second best to its own ability to regulate its own affairs towards this end. 
The regulatory ambition of the legislators takes another knock and the 
approach of the regulators looks somewhat better adapted if still 
fundamentally at odds with the self-steering programme of management. 
Of course, as was mentioned previously, autopoiesis forces us to 
consider the possibility that the regulated area is not defined by one system 
but rather by many, the exact number being a matter for empirical observation. 
The other dominant system emerging from the study of the offshore oil 
industry is that of engineering, and it is to this cognitive map that we turn next 
(Figure 6).
44
 
43 For example, Carson supra n.18; C Wright, ‘Routine Deaths: Fatal Accidents in the Oil 
Industry’, 34 Sociological Review 265-289 [1986] 
44 Although a wide range of offshore engineering sources have been drawn on in the larger 
study, a convenient overview of its development can be found in R J Howe, ‘Evolution of 
Offshore Drilling and Production Technology’, Offshore Technology Conference IV, 593-603 
[1986] 24 
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Despite the broad range of issues with which the regulators are 
concerned at this time regarding occupational health and safety, we find in the 
initial decade of the development of Britain’s offshore oil a preoccupation in 
engineering with the design and construction of the installations to the 
practical exclusion of other matters. For engineering, the North Sea represents 
the largest challenge it has ever faced but it deals with this simply by scaling 
up techniques developed in less hostile environments. Thus, it assumes that 
structural overload is the principal problem (as it was in the hurricane-prone 
Gulf of Mexico) and sets about design and construction on the basis of 
expected maximum wave height and the period that installations will be 
operational. Engineering is seeking a well-engineered platform—one that is 
both economically viable and capable of operating in its required environment. 
The lack of data from the new province means, however, that there is a 
degree of uncertainty and as a consequence a programme of scientific 
conservatism is adopted. In this way, it is hoped that over-design and margins 
for error will accommodate the uncertainty. 
Two issues are of particular importance here. First of all, the 
concentration on installation design and construction means that engineering 
cannot observe other health and safety issues, notably the more mundane 
occupational problems that produced such a toll of death and injury during this 
period. Safety is constructed purely in terms of the integrity of the installation. 
Secondly, the assumption on which this approach is based (the primacy of the 
problem of structural overload) means that engineering cannot observe other 
factors affecting structural integrity. And indeed, this systemic blindness was 
exposed on two occasions during the 1970s as first fatigue and then dynamic 
response emerged as more significant problems in the North Sea. 
In short, the difference-minimising programme of engineering (scientific 
conservatism) is certainly directed to safety but it is a narrower construction of 
that concept than that of the legislators or the regulators. Furthermore, the 
definition of a well-engineered platform as one that is both economically viable 
and suited to its environment reveals the location of engineering at the junction 
of science and economics. Thus, for as long as cost is not a significant factor 
during the initial decade of North Sea development, engineering is free to 
employ a programme of scientific conservatism: as we have seen, industry 
management at this time is happier to incur costs than to lose time. But once 
cost pressures increase—not least as a result of the redesign and modification 
necessitated by the emergent problems of fatigue and dynamic response—the 
programme of conservatism, involving over-design, larger margins of error, 
redundancy, and so on, is no longer an option and a programme which could 
help to reduce both technical and economic risks is required. In this way, 
engineering switches from the deterministic techniques of conservatism to 
probabilistic techniques that could rationally accommodate more factors, 
economic as well as technical. When that happens, the steering is in relation 
to different calculations of overall risk—still quite different from what the 
legislators and regulators observe. 
This is just a brief and simplified snapshot of a larger study but it serves 
to demonstrate how autopoiesis reveals the shortcomings of linear-causal 
25 assumptions about the regulatory process. The legislators certainly 
understood their programme of legal instrumentalism in this way but in the 
eyes of the regulators these aims seemed hopelessly optimistic and different 
strategies had to be adopted. For the regulated area, regulation was at this 
early stage either constructed as at odds with the programme of minimising 
economic risk by a programme of rapid production in the case of industry 
management or barely constructed at all in the case of engineering. 
And of course, freed form the constraints of a linear-causal approach to 
the regulatory process, interactions among regulated systems, for example, 
also become visible. Thus, the management programme of speed as the 
answer to all problems (which were always constructed as problems of 
economic risk) meant that yet more pressure was put on engineering. 
Furthermore, management constructed engineering solutions as final and 
fixed and was thus unable to observe the uncertainty which engineering was 
so concerned about. But of particular significance to regulators and legislators 
is the finding that throughout the cognitive maps of the regulated area there is 
simply no mention of occupational health and safety in any way equivalent to 
their concerns. What the autopoietic approach reveals is that it is no longer 
sufficient simply to call for tougher enforcement of detailed regulations. 
Implementationists would disagree, of course. If industry management is set 
on a course of rapid production to minimise economic risk and this is 
detrimental to the safety of workers then a tough stance is exactly what is 
needed. But it seems clear from the present approach that the codes and self-
steering programmes of the industry—especially of management—are deep-
seated, internally coherent and not something that can simply be pushed aside 
by interventionist regulation or prosecution. In other words, autopoiesis 
research produces something more than “the triviality that the legislator has to 
take into account certain facts about the addressees of his regulations”.
45 But 
what precisely does autopoiesis have to say about what regulators can do in 
the face of such closure and self-steering? 
VI. 
As we have said, regulatory success/failure depends on the second question 
mentioned above: How are the diverse processes of difference minimisation 
“structurally coupled”? To render this notion operational, we must observe 
concretely how the regulatory act is recontextualised within the different 
cascades of differences and is unfolded in their minimisation programmes. 
Regulatory success depends, then, on the ability of the regulatory system to 
recontextualise in its turn the recontextualisation in the regulated system. In 
other words, the regulators must direct their attention to the codes and 
programmes of the systems they seek to regulate. This observation will still, of 
course, be on the basis of their own distinctions and so the theory offers no 
hope of direct intervention. But as pessimistic as this sounds, it is important to 
realise that failing to problematise the situation appropriately is only likely to 
make matters even worse. 
                                                 
45 H Rottleuthner, ‘The Limits of Law: The Myth of a Regulatory Crisis’, 17 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law, 273-285, 274 [1989] 
26 It would seem, therefore, that during this initial period of the 
development of the occupational health and safety regime in the North Sea, 
while the different systems constructed events according to their own codes 
and steered according to their own programmes, there was precious little in 
the way of a recontextualisation by the regulators of the reconstruction of the 
regulations by management and engineering. While these systems operated 
to programmes of rapid production, in the case of management, and of 
scientific conservatism followed by tentative steps towards probabilistic 
techniques under cost pressures, in the case of engineering, the regulators 
maintained a straightforward attempt to prescribe everything that the industry 
should do. There was as a consequence no adaptation to the complexity of 
the regulated area and indeed no ability to adapt for as long as the programme 
remained one essentially of prescription—albeit that this was at the level of 
guidance notes. These systems, then, continued to evolve in rather path-
dependant ways, steering according to their own difference-minimising 
programmes and largely indifferent to the self-steering of others. It comes as 
no surprise, then, to discover that in due course, following the world’s worst 
offshore accident in 1988, a further Public Inquiry
46 found little to praise in the 
regime and plenty to condemn. This was regulatory failure on a grand scale. 
Significantly, however, the Inquiry did not call for more prescriptive regulation 
and tougher enforcement. Rather, recognising the futility of this programme—
even when the prescription was in the form of guidance notes—the 
recommendation was for an entirely new approach. 
Implemented in full, these recommendations have produced a regime 
which may be briefly summarised as follows: the existing prescriptive 
regulations have been replaced with “goal-setting” regulations, and the owners 
and operators of offshore installations are required to submit to the regulators 
“safety cases” without which an installation may not operate. Among other 
things, these safety cases should demonstrate (1) that a safety management 
system is in place which is adequate to ensure compliance with statutory 
health and safety requirements, and (2) that all hazards which have the 
potential to cause a major accident have been identified and their risks 
evaluated, and that measures have been taken to reduce the risk to a level 
that is as low as reasonably practicable. It is possible to see in these changes 
a recognition of some of the problems revealed by the cognitive mapping 
approach, such as the inability of the regulators to keep pace with 
developments and the need to encourage a less deterministic approach in 
engineering. The question is, however, whether this recognition translates into 
mechanisms which can foster structural coupling of the different systems, and 
encourage ongoing mutual recontextualisation of each system’s 
reconstructions and self-steering. Four different scenarios of structural 
coupling can be distinguished. 
Scenario One - Tangential Response 
In many situations, despite sensitivity to regulatory impulses, the regulated 
area will not respond in a predictable way. As was seen in the case of 
                                                 
46 Lord Cullen, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (Cm. 1310) (London, HMSO, 
1990) 
27 engineering, a variety of difference-minimising programmes are possible in 
response to the irritations of events. Had we continued the study for a longer 
period we would have seen a series of further changes of programme in this 
system as well as in the system of industry management where the 
programme of rapid production was in due course replaced by a programme of 
cost-reduction. And yet throughout all of this, a continuing problem of 
accidents and injuries was alleged.
47 The interesting point for observation in 
the context of autopoietic research is the reaction of the regulatory system 
when it confronts only such ongoing chaotic reactions on its internal screens. 
There are several ways in which this chaotic recontextualisation can itself be 
recontextualised by the regulators. If their internal difference minimisation 
allows for “symbolic politics”, then they may simply ignore the chaos and 
continue with their regulatory efforts. Alternatively, they may try to strengthen 
their cognitive and material resources: more money, more legislation and more 
social science analysis of causal processes. In the case of the offshore 
regulators, it appears that they ultimately concentrated on the prevention of 
catastrophic accidents and, in this way, the ongoing toll of more mundane 
accidents could fade from view. The cumulative catastrophic effects of such 
minor issues, however, were also obscured until the Piper Alpha disaster in 
1988. 
In such circumstances of ongoing chaotic reactions to regulatory 
impulses, however, one response seems to be especially promising for 
regulators. This is the situation when the regulators recontextualise the 
reactions as non-understandable, non-predictable, idiosyncratic “tangential 
responses” and give up any attempt to establish stable structures in the 
regulated system or systems. Instead, they change the strategy and adapt 
their stimuli to the tangential response character. They limit their efforts and try 
only punctual intervention, wait until any of the usual idiosyncratic reactions 
appear on their screens and then try a punctual stimulus of a different kind and 
continue in this way until the regulated systems have moved somewhat into 
their desired direction. 
Although this approach respects the limits of autopoietic systems, it is 
clearly an extremely minimal response and one that carries with it a high 
degree of risk. While it may, therefore, be suited to some circumstances (such 
as the “control” of currency values), it is probably of limited value in the domain 
of occupational health and safety or other situations of technological 
complexity where stronger structural coupling is called for. 
Scenario Two - Bifurcation and Attractors 
There is perhaps a danger that the static format of a cognitive map may lead 
us to believe that we can at least predict how a given system will react to given 
inputs. But here the simplification that we must inevitably engage in is apt to 
mislead us, because in such chaotic situations the causal chains revealed by 
cognitive maps are not the totality of the picture. As a non-trivial machine, a 
regulated system will react with different outputs even if we know the 
deterministic relations within the field and keep the input constant. The 
chances for empirical research grow, however, if our field is, in spite of the 
                                                 
47 Carson, supra n.18; Wright, supra n.43 
28 chaotic macro-relations, self-organising in such a way that its macro-structures 
develop alongside bifurcations and attractors. 
This seems to offer an opportunity for rereading in the regulatory 
system. Indeed, contrary to the expectations of the critics, it opens up the 
possibility of social control through law! Assume that recursive and self-
organising systems can arrive at new attractor-states on the basis of external 
interference. Then, through general norms or specific legal acts the law can try 
to produce this external interference, irritating the system in such a way, and in 
spite of all chaos, that it moves from its attractor-state to one which is at least 
compatible with the aims of the legislator.
48 By analogy with “systems therapy” 
in psychology,
49 we can envisage the problems with such an attractor-strategy 
lying in the process of trial-and-error. Only in this way, it seems, can we probe 
for sensitive “intervention points” which will provoke the desired instability. 
While again the trial-and-error nature of this approach raises doubts 
over its suitability or perhaps acceptability in high-risk settings, it may indeed 
have a resonance with aspects of the new offshore safety regime. There has 
been considerable interest in the industry in the apparent discovery that the 
requirement for systematic risk assessment actually results in lower costs. It is 
perhaps fortunate for the regulators that the procedures demanded by the new 
regime (representing an attractor state of reduced risk) have apparently 
coincided with those which the industry was already disposed to follow to the 
attractor state of reduced costs without any need for trial and error.
50 
Generalisations here are dangerous but there may be other situations in which 
the sort of proceduralisation now operating in offshore health and safety will 
represent an advance over existing prescriptive approaches in areas of 
complexity and uncertainty. 
Scenario Three - Synchronising Difference Reduction 
The usual situation in a given social field is that several self-regulating 
processes are going on at the same time. When several differences are 
minimised simultaneously they will partially reinforce and partially sabotage 
each other. Our regulatory system will not be in a position to install additional 
difference minimisation programmes in the field—it only minimises its own 
differences. But the regulatory messages are re-read, re-constructed and 
recontextualised in the implementation field. Legal norms may make one of 
the internal programmes much more costly, or produce incentives for another 
one. Generally speaking, the interference will change the competitive situation 
between different minimisation programmes, increasing the attractiveness of 
one and decreasing the attractiveness of others.
51 Thus, our interference may 
lead to systematic control results in the critical case when self-regulation 
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29 processes in different social fields tend to work in the same direction and thus 
reinforce each other. Some might call this coincidence effectiveness of law 
and attribute it to causal processes. 
In the context of the new offshore health and safety regime, there is an 
interesting requirement which although applicable mainly to circumstances 
involving technology and risk is beginning to enjoy more widespread use.
52 
This is the demand that each safety case should include a detailed 
quantitative assessment of the risks affecting the installation and that the risk 
in each case must be reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably 
practicable. While the new regime cannot impose this mathematical difference 
minimisation programme on the regulated area to the exclusion of its own 
steering programmes, it can, nevertheless, encourage change in desired 
directions since it requires those preparing safety cases to be explicit about 
their assumptions and to make manifest the degree of uncertainty with which 
they are operating. In this rather indirect way, therefore, self-steering 
programmes that become difficult or even impossible to justify in terms of risk-
minimisation are disadvantaged, while those which minimise risk and are open 
to learning are favoured. 
Scenario Four - Binding Institutions 
This is the case where wildly flowing meaning cascades are channelled 
parallel to each other and mutually interconnected in such a way that a 
regulator can produce systematic effects. Formal organisations, when they are 
multilingual, tend to work as binding institutions. They force the spontaneous 
uncontrolled flow of parallel differences for a certain amount of time together 
so that they have to be compatible with each other. Of special interest is intra-
organisational juridification, i.e. when organisational processes are legally 
reconstructed in such a way that they themselves become sources of law. 
These processes have been analysed in detail elsewhere.
53 The result is a 
close structural coupling of law and other social processes within the 
organisation. And here we have a case where the self-regulation programmes 
of the law can be directly linked with the legal self-regulation within the 
organisation. In such situations we can expect a high degree of regulatory 
success. 
If we again try to observe how the regulatory system recontextualises 
this situation, we will be surprised how little the system needs to know about 
intra-organisational dynamics. No legal economics and no organisational 
knowledge need to be produced. The question is only one of how legal norms 
are changing legal norms. The only caveat is a need to pay attention to the 
limits of structural coupling, for the links in the organisation between its internal 
law and other ongoing processes will break if the external law demands too 
much. And this would be the strategic task for empirical research: to find and 
even predict the rupture points in concrete structural couplings. While this 
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30 remains a problem of trial and error, it can be seen that this approach to 
structural coupling has a much greater ability to deal with complex and high-
risk situations. Furthermore, this approach indicates that the results of 
autopoiesis research imply recommendations also for regulated systems as 
well as for regulators. 
This scenario is, therefore, of particular interest for our concrete 
example. Traditionally this has been a difficult area for trade unions to gain a 
foothold and there have been persistent allegations of victimisation of the 
workforce where there have been attempts to unionise. Equally, the industry is 
also notable for the large proportion of work that is contracted out, resulting in 
potentially complex employment situations on an individual installation.
54 
There is, then, the potential for a number of different meaning systems to be 
involved in a relatively confined and extremely volatile environment, each 
operating to its own difference minimising programme. With factors such as 
these in mind, the new regime requires that each safety case detail the safety 
management system in place on the installation, which system must include 
provision for workforce involvement in both the development and the ongoing 
review of the safety case. Other regulations put in place just before the new 
regime became operative provide for workforce safety representatives and 
safety committees. Equally, the safety management system must detail the 
way in which it is interfaced with the safety management systems of 
contractors working on the installation. Here, then, is an example of a binding 
institution which goes beyond formal contact between regulator and regulated 
and sets goals for all those involved in the regulated area to set up their own 
auditable structure which binds together the disparate strands of which it is 
composed. While the regulatory system in this auditing role cannot be totally 
ignorant of what is involved, it no longer needs to seek to attain the impossible 
levels of knowledge required to prescribe in advance what must be done in 
every situation. 
VII. 
Autopoiesis and empiricism are not, then, as mutually exclusive as 
might have been suspected. In conjunction with techniques such as cognitive 
mapping, it is possible to obtain a distinctly different view of a research area, 
which is potentially more adequately complex and not reduced to the dominant 
rationality of the analysis employed. In other words, changing our map of the 
regulatory process to an autopoietic view allows the study area to be taken 
more seriously. While cognitive mapping has been proposed here, perhaps 
other (more sophisticated) empirical techniques may also be useful when they 
are deployed within the context of autopoiesis. Only practice will tell. But 
equally, experience may reveal that we will have to lower drastically our 
expectations as to the sophistication of available instruments and be content 
with narratives, with storytelling, with case studies, with more or less 
journalistic type of inquiries. But one thing is clear: autopoiesis theory 
essentially depends on systematic empirical observation. 
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31 In conclusion, however, a somewhat more technical question regarding 
autopoietic empiricism remains to be answered: in what way does autopoiesis 
depend on empiricism if falsification is excluded and causal explanation and 
prediction marginalised? To understand the role of empirical observation in the 
autopoietic framework we need to enter somewhat into the nuances of the 
debates within the epistemology of social constructivism. The starting point is, 
contrary to many myths about constructivism, this: the environment exists! It is 
not an invention of discourse. The problem is only that the environment cannot 
be reached by the system’s operations and, accordingly, the system is forced 
to invent internal constructs of the external world in order to cope with it. This 
is not only true for the cognitive acts of the stomach, of the brain and the mind, 
but also for communicative cognition and for empirical observations within the 
scientific discourse. They can never reach the outside world. They only 
produce artificial data for science as a social system to enable it to cope with 
the unknown outside world. And this is the point where the debate within the 
constructivist camp begins. It concerns the qualities of this “coping”. Is it the 
mere survival of certain empirico-theoretical constructs? Is it the pragmatic use 
of scientific constructs for social action? Is it the resonance of the instruments 
of science with the music of the outside world? 
Amid these turbulent waves of the epistemological debate, autopoiesis 
tries to steer a stable course avoiding the temptation of both sirens of 
constructivism: Mary Hesse’s “soft programme” as well as the “strong 
programme” of the Edinburgh school of social constructivism. Bloor’s “strong 
programme” excludes for complex theories the possibility of a world feedback 
so that any science, even that of law and society, is nothing but a “socially 
generated imaginative schema like other social myths”.
55 Against this, 
autopoiesis stresses the relevance for theory of empirical observation due to 
its direct structural coupling to consciousness and its indirect structural 
coupling to the outside world. Empirical observations are artificial constructs 
within science but they have real contacts with the environment insofar as they 
make themselves sensitive and react to perturbations from the outside world 
by building up new structures. They are not themselves perceptions but 
communications about perceptions. To be sure, this does not allow for 
“correspondence” of scientific constructs with outside events, but it binds the 
system to its environment by self-determined constraints. Thus, autopoiesis 
remains a coherence theory of truth: we have to look for coherence between 
two types of internal constructs—theoretical concepts and empirical facts—
that are constructed according to diverse procedures. But via perturbation one 
of these constructs—the artificial data—is closely coupled to psychic (i.e. 
individual mental) perception of the outside world. Thus, Edinburgh’s “social 
idealism” with all its solipsist and monadologist threats is rejected. And 
perhaps it comes as a relief that on this basis we do not agree with 
Feyerabend’s “anything goes” relativism. 
So do we agree with Mary Hesse’s soft programme of constructivism: 
“[w]e construct the natural world in our science, but s-t [space and time reality] 
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32 constrains these constructions by feedback”?
56 Our answer is a decisive yes 
and no. Yes, empirical research is world construction, not a reality test. Yes, 
empirical research constructs the environment in an internal model and 
simultaneously produces constraints for its constructive imagination by 
exposing it to the feedback of perturbations. But here the difference begins. 
No, the feedback does not come from the external world; it is purely internal. 
No, spatio-temporal reality itself does not produce any constraint. It is the 
cognising observer (psychic or communicative) who decides about which 
constraints to create and to which perturbations to expose the constructive 
imagination. Thus, feedback is not information from the external world, but 
rather is internally produced information stimulated by perturbations. 
Thus, it is more than mere viability, the sheer survival of a construct that 
gives empirically supported theories their certainty of being in tune with the 
environment. It is the self-assertion of internal recursive operations that are 
able to develop stable eigenvalues. And they do this not only as a formal 
calculus, but also in close structural coupling with recursive operations of other 
cognitive processes and those exposing themselves to the perturbations of the 
outer world, which will always remain unknown to them. Thus, our highly 
speculative constructs do know that they are on the right track, but they do not 
know where they are. 
Our constructs feel a resistance from the objects they produce. They 
expose their self-produced expectations at predefined points to outside 
perturbations. Everything is in the hands of the recursive operations 
themselves: the expectations, the conditions under which such expectations 
are fulfilled or disappointed, the consequences drawn from such an 
experience. Only the yes and the no makes for the crucial point of contact 
where they lose control, where they make themselves dependent upon their 
environment. 
Theories do not die from a falsification via independent empirical facts. 
We called this the omnipotence fantasies of empirical researchers, which they 
tend to develop when they feel disturbed by speculative theories. The only 
thing that empiricism can do is to create counter-irritations and compel theory 
to create new routinisations that may keep itself in tune with other constructed 
worlds or drive itself into implausibility. This is what we would call a 
relationship of therapy—of course, not the usual interventionist therapies but a 
therapy rethought in the spirit of autopoiesis. Has Marxism, for example, died 
from its countless empirical refutations? For decades we have witnessed 
successful immunisation strategies by this Grand Theory by which it moved 
into admirably complex constructions. Marxism’s disaster had its origins 
elsewhere, in its loss of resonance with other cultural, political and economic 
operations, especially with its own communicative political and social 
consequences which rendered it more and more difficult to reintegrate them 
into the theory framework. In many respects (for example, with respect to the 
analysis of social differentiation, the concept of systemic autonomy, the 
circularity of social self-production, the totalising tendencies of social systems 
and human alienation), theories of social self-organisation are the legitimate 
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33 heirs of Marxian theories. At the moment they seem to be in good resonance 
with other recursive processes in modern society. And only the future will 
reveal whether they survive their self-produced consequences. But, given their 
esoteric character, will they have any consequences? 
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